What was the Arab Spring?
PhD, English Literature (Lancaster University)
Date Published: 31.05.2024,
Last Updated: 31.05.2024
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Definition
The Arab Spring refers to a wave of protests and uprisings occurring in the Middle East and North Africa that challenged the authoritarian regimes in these regions. The protests began in December 2010 in Tunisia when a street vendor Tarek El-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in protest of the government, later dying from his injuries. This inspired similar protests in other Arab countries, notably Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. In a short period of time, the uprisings saw the deposition of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi (Qaddafi).
While some of these uprisings resulted in democratic change, some countries have not seen success. As James L. Gelvin states,
The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt created the template—a false template, as it were—through which the media and the general public have viewed the success or failure of other uprisings in the region. There are three aspects of this template. First, in the public imagination at least, both uprisings were largely peaceful, with tech-savvy youths playing the lead role in the drama (an exaggeration on both counts). Second, both uprisings brought down autocrats when the “people’s army” refused to shoot at protesters. Third, both got rid of autocrats in a matter of weeks. (“Conclusion,” in The Arab Spring, 2018)
Edited by Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch
The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt created the template—a false template, as it were—through which the media and the general public have viewed the success or failure of other uprisings in the region. There are three aspects of this template. First, in the public imagination at least, both uprisings were largely peaceful, with tech-savvy youths playing the lead role in the drama (an exaggeration on both counts). Second, both uprisings brought down autocrats when the “people’s army” refused to shoot at protesters. Third, both got rid of autocrats in a matter of weeks. (“Conclusion,” in The Arab Spring, 2018)
This guide will explore the precursors to the Arab Spring, the main events of the uprisings, the role social media played, and the impact of these protests today.
Causes of the uprisings
The uprisings began as a response to the political repression and human rights violations brought about by authoritarian regimes, as well as the poverty, unemployment, and changing demographic structures within the affected regions.
Authoritarian regimes
At the time of the uprisings, many countries in the Arab world were ruled by authoritarian regimes, with leaders who had held power for decades. Such oppressive regimes were characterized by political repression, human rights violations, stifling of free speech, and cronyism. (For a detailed account of how authoritarianism arose in the Middle East, see Selin M. Bölme’s “The Roots of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,” Authoritarianism in the Middle East, 2015).
The events of the Arab Spring challenged aging regimes, aiming to “obtain dignity, freedom, justice, equality and a democratic environment” that protected “political and economic rights” and allowed for self-expression (Karakoç, “Introduction,” Authoritarianism in the Middle East, 2015).
Economic troubles
Despite the Arab world having low rates of extreme poverty, high levels of per capita income and education spending in the developing world, there were severe economic issues prior to the uprisings. In How Capitalism Failed the Arab World, Richard Javad Heydarian explains that the Arab world, according to the Arab Human Development Report (AHDR),
suffers from one of the highest rates of unemployment, struggles to attract sufficient investments to move up the production chain, and continues to be a laggard in science and technology, even as its Asian neighbours pull ahead in global rankings. (2014)
Richard Javad Heydarian
suffers from one of the highest rates of unemployment, struggles to attract sufficient investments to move up the production chain, and continues to be a laggard in science and technology, even as its Asian neighbours pull ahead in global rankings. (2014)
Unemployment highly affected the younger demographics as could be seen in Tunisia. On the surface, Tunisia appeared prosperous. However,
Tunisia presented a paradox. Many analysts were surprised that how it is possible that a country assumed to be politically stable, educationally progressive, and economically prosperous would explode into countrywide protests that caused the downfall of one of the strongest dictators in the MENA region. (Mohammad Dawood Sofi, The Tunisian Revolution and Democratic Transition, 2021)
Mohammad Dawood Sofi
Tunisia presented a paradox. Many analysts were surprised that how it is possible that a country assumed to be politically stable, educationally progressive, and economically prosperous would explode into countrywide protests that caused the downfall of one of the strongest dictators in the MENA region. (Mohammad Dawood Sofi, The Tunisian Revolution and Democratic Transition, 2021)
Despite this, for the poorest in the country, particularly those outside of the capital, this prosperous Tunisia was nowhere to be found:
Half of graduates with a masters degree were unemployed in 2010. Unemployment was also far higher among younger people than it was on average, and much worse in the interior and southern regions, where the uprising began, than it was on the coast. By the accounts of Tunisians themselves, perceptions of corruption, inequalities and a lack of opportunity had dramatically worsened in the last two or three years before the uprising. (Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring, 2012).
Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren
Half of graduates with a masters degree were unemployed in 2010. Unemployment was also far higher among younger people than it was on average, and much worse in the interior and southern regions, where the uprising began, than it was on the coast. By the accounts of Tunisians themselves, perceptions of corruption, inequalities and a lack of opportunity had dramatically worsened in the last two or three years before the uprising. (Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring, 2012).
Demographic issues
In the 2013 AHDR entitled “Arab Spring: Demographics in a region in transition” Barry Mirkin explained that,
The causes of recent revolutions in the Arab world are numerous and complex, but have been exacerbated by the region’s underlying demographics. Changing age structure, combined with other demographic trends have exacerbated the challenges to governments, particularly regarding unemployment, underemployment and job creation.
The combination of an increasing youth population (that had doubled since 1980), poor employment opportunities, and inequality between the elite classes and the poorest citizens contributed greatly to the Arab Spring.
The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia
The self-immolation of Tarek El-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi is often seen as the start of the Arab Spring protests, specifically triggering the Jasmine Revolution (as the media dubbed it) in Tunisia. As Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch write,
[Bouazizi’s] action was borne of frustration and disillusionment over the socioeconomic malaise and political repression in his country. Little did he know that he would light a fire across the region. Shortly thereafter, mass protests pushed the Tunisian president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, out of office. (“Uprisings in the Arab Spring,” The Arab Spring, 2018)
On 18 December, the day after Bouazizi set fire to himself, the protesters grew in number and gathered outside of the governor’s office. However, in response to this peaceful demonstration
Protesters were met with tear gas and police brutality. Some demonstrators were arrested, and many others were injured. On 19 December, clashes between the police and the demonstrators continued in Sidi Bouzid as more people joined the rallies. (Alcinda Honwana, Youth and Revolution in Tunisia, 2013)
Alcinda Honwana
Protesters were met with tear gas and police brutality. Some demonstrators were arrested, and many others were injured. On 19 December, clashes between the police and the demonstrators continued in Sidi Bouzid as more people joined the rallies. (Alcinda Honwana, Youth and Revolution in Tunisia, 2013)
Protestors retaliated by “throwing stones, burning tyres in the middle of the street, and torching official government buildings and cars” (Honwana, 2013).
The protest spread to other towns, such as Kasserine, Gafsa, and Sfax, and later Regueb, Meknassi, and Menzel Bouzaiene. Many were injured in the demonstration in Menzel Bouzaiene and two 18-year-olds (Mohamed Ammari and Chawki Hidri) were killed.
While the government announced their plans to deal with unemployment, this was too little too late. President Ben Ali made matters worse when he visited Mohamed Bouazizi in hospital which was seen as an empty publicity stunt. Bouazizi later died from his injuries on 4th January. Ten days after Bouazizi’s death, Ben Ali fled the country to seek refuge in Saudi Arabia. Following Ben Ali’s departure, an interim government was set up.
The protests had an enormous impact on the rest of the Arab world, setting off a chain reaction that is still being felt today:
Tunisia had demonstrated how brittle these Arab dictatorships were, how easily and how quickly they could be swept away. By overcoming the barrier of fear, Tunisians had shown that peaceful protest could succeed, and at a heady pace. They had removed their ruler in less than a month of popular action in an unarmed uprising. They were as shocked by their own success as the world was. And success sells. (Noueihed and Warren, 2012)
The Egyptian Revolution (2011)
Inspired by the events in Tunisia, Egyptians turned to protest in order to remove dictator Hosni Mubarak from power. In Chronicles of the Egyptian Revolution and its Aftermath, M. Cherif Bassiouni explains that,
By 2011, the struggle for freedom, justice, and human dignity had been long brewing. Most Egyptians could no longer tolerate the repressive and abusive practices of the police and the country’s security agencies or the corruption of the Mubarak regime’s oligarchy, which included extrajudicial executions; torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in prisons, police facilities, and public places; and the disappearances of many individuals. (2016)
M. Cherif Bassiouni
By 2011, the struggle for freedom, justice, and human dignity had been long brewing. Most Egyptians could no longer tolerate the repressive and abusive practices of the police and the country’s security agencies or the corruption of the Mubarak regime’s oligarchy, which included extrajudicial executions; torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in prisons, police facilities, and public places; and the disappearances of many individuals. (2016)
The protest began on 25 January, also National Police Day, as a response to the death of Khaled Said at the hands of two police officers (Awad Suleiman and Mahmoud Salah) in June of the previous year. Said had been targeted after he posted a video showing officers handling illegal drugs. As Bassiouni writes,
An initial post-mortem and police investigation concluded that he had died of suffocation after trying to swallow a packet of drugs that he had been carrying, but witnesses described a brutal beating, and photos of Said’s battered and bloody face, taken by his brother on a cell phone in the morgue and leaked to the media, left no doubt that beatings had caused his death. [...] Khaled Said’s image became the face that launched the 2011 Revolution. Young people adopted the slogan Kulluna Khaled Saı¨d, or “We are all Khaled Said.” Said’s death was the proverbial last straw on the camel’s back: thousands like him had met the same fate during the six decades of dictatorial military rule since the July 23, 1952, Nasser-era military coup. (2016)
The first few days of the protest were held in Tahrir Square (previously known as Ismailia Square, a significant site in Egypt’s 1919 revolution), with more than 250,000 people gathered and “resembled a family outing” (Bassiouni, 2016). Demonstrations, however, quickly turned to violence as Mubarak set out to quash the rebellion.
Across 18 days, 850 civilians (armed only with “stones and makeshift Molotov cocktails”) were killed by police (Bassiouni, 2016). Mubarak relinquished power on February 11, followed by a night-long celebration took place at Tahrir Square with crowds chanting “Raise your head up high! You are an Egyptian!”. Watch the clip below to see footage from the celebration:
The SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) took over leadership until the 2012 elections which saw the Brotherhood elected to power. The Brotherhood would also be removed in 2013 as the result of a military coup:
In Egypt, the old regime reasserted itself through a military coup on July 3, 2013, which overthrew the elected government of Mohamed el-Morsi. The dizzying pace of the Arab Spring has now slowed to a gritty, desperate, and increasingly bloody set of interlocked battles for power. A counterrevolution led by Saudi Arabia and the monarchies of the GCC has at least temporarily blocked further change. (Marc Lynch, “Introduction,” The Arab Uprisings Explained, 2014)
Yemeni Revolution (2011-)
While the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt had swiftly and effectively achieved their aims, the revolt in Yemen resulted in a civil war which is still being waged today.
In late January 2011, Yemen’s first demonstration was held in the capital, Sana’a, with 16,000 protesters in attendance. Protestors demanded the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In response, on 2 February, Saleh announced he would not seek re-election in 2013 and not pass down the presidency to his son. This did little to appease protestors who had heard similar promises before. While Saleh attempted to abate the protests through concessions such as tax cuts and extensions of social welfare, he combined this tactic with violent oppression:
In Sana’a, as early as in January, Tawwakul Karman, and a number of other activists were arrested, while others were harassed and beaten. [...] While the regime’s violence seemed to be part of the daily ordeal for the protestors, to which they responded tirelessly with peaceful methods, things started to change in mid-March 2011. (Bogumila Hall, “Yemen’s Failed Transition,” Social Movements and Civil War, 2017).
Edited by Donatella della Porta et al
In Sana’a, as early as in January, Tawwakul Karman, and a number of other activists were arrested, while others were harassed and beaten. [...] While the regime’s violence seemed to be part of the daily ordeal for the protestors, to which they responded tirelessly with peaceful methods, things started to change in mid-March 2011. (Bogumila Hall, “Yemen’s Failed Transition,” Social Movements and Civil War, 2017).
This violence escalated, culminating in the massacre on 18 March in which snipers opened fire on protestors, killing 52 and injuring around 200. Saleh declared a state of emergency following this.
The protests intensified between April and May, resulting in the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) proposing a plan for Saleh, requiring him to step down. Despite his initial refusal, Saleh eventually relented and agreed to sign this. However, the signing ceremony on 3 June was interrupted by an explosion in the presidential palace, making it “clear that a once peaceful uprising had taken the shape of a war” (Hall, 2017).
On 21 October, the UN Security Council urged Saleh to transfer power. Saleh signed the GCC deal, handing over power to the vice president in exchange for immunity from prosecution. The vice president, President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, took over the presidency in February, ending Saleh’s 33-year rule.
While achieving its goal of ousting President Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Yemen uprising has resulted in one of the worst humanitarian crises in history. The uprising did not end the country’s economic problems and political issues, including conflicts with jihadists and a military which, primarily, retained loyalty to the deposed President Saleh. In 2014, civil war broke out, and in 2015 President Hadi fled the country when Islamist political and military group, the Houthis, seized control of the capital.
Concern over the Houthis taking over Yemen resulted in Saudi Arabia (and other Arab states) initiating an air strike, calling for Hadi’s government to be reinstated. The Yemen Civil War continues and, as of August 2023, 337,000 have been killed, as either a direct result of the fighting or indirectly due to famine and shortage of medical supplies, and more than 3 million have been displaced. For a detailed explanation of the crisis in Yemen and the political situation in the area, see Helen Lackner’s Yemen (2022) and Saddam Abdulkarim Obaid’s Yemen’s Road to War (2023).
Libyan Revolt (2011)
As John Oakes comments,
It will be the events that took place in Benghazi between 17 and 20 February 2011 which will long be significant in Libya’s history. It may all become clearer with time, but it seems that it started as a small street demonstration on 15 February, superficially similar to those in Tunis and Cairo. (Libya, 2011)
John Oakes
It will be the events that took place in Benghazi between 17 and 20 February 2011 which will long be significant in Libya’s history. It may all become clearer with time, but it seems that it started as a small street demonstration on 15 February, superficially similar to those in Tunis and Cairo. (Libya, 2011)
Factors contributing to the unrest in Benghazi included economic disparity, social inequality, and corruption within Colonel Mu’ammar Gaddafi’s regime:
The Libyan revolution was primarily triggered by the socio-economic effects of an unfair distribution of power and Gaddafi’s nepotism. The Libyan state, and in particular the economic system, could not provide a successful employment policy and economic modernization. The inequality in regional development, particularly for the eastern part of Libya, and Cyrenaica’s marginalization from the centre increased anger against the regime. In addition, successful cases from the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt boosted Libyans’ courage in protesting against the regime in the middle of February 2011. (Ramazan Erdağ, Libya in the Arab Spring, 2017)
Ramazan Erdağ
The Libyan revolution was primarily triggered by the socio-economic effects of an unfair distribution of power and Gaddafi’s nepotism. The Libyan state, and in particular the economic system, could not provide a successful employment policy and economic modernization. The inequality in regional development, particularly for the eastern part of Libya, and Cyrenaica’s marginalization from the centre increased anger against the regime. In addition, successful cases from the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt boosted Libyans’ courage in protesting against the regime in the middle of February 2011. (Ramazan Erdağ, Libya in the Arab Spring, 2017)
Under Gaddafi, Libyan citizens were subjected to a repressive regime where freedom of speech was prohibited and dissent against the government was punishable by life in prison.
Political prisoners were often held at Abu Salim prison in Tripoli which was notorious for abusive treatment of inmates, including torture and lack of medical care. This led to the 1996 prison riots which left 1200 prisoners dead; this brutal massacre would become one of the main causes of the revolution that eventually toppled Gadaffi. For many years, the families of the victims were unaware of what had happened during the massacre. Thirteen years after the massacre in April 2004, partly due to rising international pressure and human rights campaigners within Libya, Gaddafi confirmed the number killed in the massacre and, later, offered financial compensation to the families.
The families of the deceased played a pivotal role in the Libyan uprising:
In February 2011, as antigovernment uprisings swept the Middle East region, the families helped change the course of Libya’s history even more profoundly as the catalyst for the Libyan uprising. When their primary representative, a young human rights lawyer, was arrested on February 15, the families took to the streets to demand his release. Thousands joined their protest, which spread across the country and sparked the uprising that ultimately, in August 2011, brought down the Gaddafi regime. (Jo Becker, Campaigning for Justice, 2012)
Jo Becker
In February 2011, as antigovernment uprisings swept the Middle East region, the families helped change the course of Libya’s history even more profoundly as the catalyst for the Libyan uprising. When their primary representative, a young human rights lawyer, was arrested on February 15, the families took to the streets to demand his release. Thousands joined their protest, which spread across the country and sparked the uprising that ultimately, in August 2011, brought down the Gaddafi regime. (Jo Becker, Campaigning for Justice, 2012)
Following the arrest of the lawyer, Fathi Terbil Salwa, a “Day of Rage” was organized which, while protestors were peaceful, resulted in police aggression. As violence escalated, rebel groups formed the National Transitional Council (NTC) in opposition to Gaddafi, and protests gained international concern.
The UN and NATO introduced measures to protect Libyan citizens, instituting a “no-fly zone” over Libya and air strikes. When the rebel groups took the capital, Tripoli, in August 2011, Gaddafi fled; he was later killed in 2011. However, despite the end of Gaddafi's rule, political instability continued in Yemen:
The killing of Gaddafi and collapse of his regime did not bring peace and stability to the country. [...] In January 2012, Libya was the scene of violence. Many people died and were injured in clashes between Gaddafi’s supporters and supporters of the new government. The new government attempted to unify many unaffiliated militia groups under central command and exert control over them. (Erdağ, 2017)
Syrian Civil War (2011 -)
Since 2011, over half a million people have been killed and over 12 million citizens have been displaced in Syria as the uprising turned to civil war.
Amidst the protests in Tunisia and Egypt, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad was confident that his government would not be the next to fall:
In January 2011 in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Bashar al-Asad insisted that his country and regime were immune to the upheaval that had toppled the Tunisian regime and rattled Mubarak’s regime in Egypt. Syria, he claimed, was different. (Itamar Rabinovich and Carmit Valensi, Syrian Requiem, 2021)
Itamar Rabinovich and Carmit Valensi
In January 2011 in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Bashar al-Asad insisted that his country and regime were immune to the upheaval that had toppled the Tunisian regime and rattled Mubarak’s regime in Egypt. Syria, he claimed, was different. (Itamar Rabinovich and Carmit Valensi, Syrian Requiem, 2021)
However, Asad “overstated his regime’s sense of security,” despite the fact that “he and his underlings were fully aware that Syria was in ferment” (Rabinovich and Valensi, 2021). The spread of radical Islamism, protests in Damascus, drought, and poverty were creating tension throughout the country.
One of the main protests against Asad’s government occurred in mid-March in Dar’a when a group of young boys sprayed graffiti on the walls of a local school which criticized the regime. The boys were arrested and tortured. One of the boys (only thirteen years old) was mutilated and killed by the police.
Demonstrations starting on 18 March moved throughout Syria from Houran and Latakia to Banyas and Deirez-Zor. Demonstrators were shot, arrested, tortured, and murdered, exacerbating the protests:
The regime’s response to the early demonstrations was twofold. On the one hand, the government cracked down violently with arrests, torture, and murder and adamantly opposed the significant political reforms demanded by the demonstrators. On the other, it did try to placate the public with a series of modest, limited reforms and symbolic concessions such as raising salaries to some certain low-wage earners and offering Syrian citizenship to a large number of Kurds residing in northeast Syria. (Rabinovich and Valens, 2021)
The largest protest took place on 25 March in a demonstration known as “the Friday of Glory” in Dar’a in which security forces shot protestors. In the days following, Asad fired his cabinet, including Prime Minister Naji al-Atari and Deputy Prime Minister Abdallah al-Dardari.
The violence continued, escalating the initial protest into an insurgency as organized militia became involved in the combat. As of today, there are many players involved in the Syrian conflict. Groups now involved in the conflict include the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Kurdish Rebel Fighters, ISIS, Jabhat Fath al-Sham, Hezbollah, and the Syrian Democratic Forces.
Neighboring countries have also become embroiled in Syria’s civil war, with the Asad regime supported by Iran, Russia, Hezbollah (the Lebanese Shia movement), and Shia Muslim militia and the rebels supported by Turkey, the Gulf Arab states, the United States, and Jordan.
The power dynamics in the region, shifting alliances, and international involvement have contributed to the complex character of the Syrian Civil War. For a detailed analysis of the changing political landscape in Syria since 2011, see Raymond Hinnebusch and Omar Imady’s edited collection The Syrian Uprising (2018).
Syrian civilians have been caught in the middle of this conflict, creating a refugee crisis in the region. In “The Roots of Authoritarianism in the Middle East” Selin M. Bölme writes,
The situation in Syria, which is by far the greatest tragedy of the region, continues to deteriorate. Syrian protests with demands for freedom and the end to corruption began in March 2011 but turned into a civil war due to the government’s systematic use of extreme violence against peaceful protesters. All parties to the conflict have violated international humanitarian and human rights laws, and the relentless violence and brutality further intensifies day by day. The number of killed and injured civilians is increasing, and every day more people are fleeing Syria. Civilians are facing violence, hunger, disease and other hardships under siege and this situation could endure for years. (Authoritarianism in the Middle East, 2015)
Edited by Jülide Karakoç
The situation in Syria, which is by far the greatest tragedy of the region, continues to deteriorate. Syrian protests with demands for freedom and the end to corruption began in March 2011 but turned into a civil war due to the government’s systematic use of extreme violence against peaceful protesters. All parties to the conflict have violated international humanitarian and human rights laws, and the relentless violence and brutality further intensifies day by day. The number of killed and injured civilians is increasing, and every day more people are fleeing Syria. Civilians are facing violence, hunger, disease and other hardships under siege and this situation could endure for years. (Authoritarianism in the Middle East, 2015)
For more on the crisis, see Danilo Mandić’s The Syrian Refugee Crisis (2022) and Nikolaos Van Dam’s Destroying a Nation (2017).
The role of social media
One of the major factors in the Arab Spring was the use of social media by protestors. It was used to organize groups of protestors from different regions, disseminate information, and raise awareness of what was happening on both a national and international level.
As Jason Pack argues, these uprisings were distinct from previous revolutions (such as in France in 1789 or Iran in 1979) as “they were bottom-up, leaderless, and devoid of an overarching ideology”:
These unique features of the Arab Spring movements were only possible because twenty-first-century communications technology allowed for spontaneous mass popular organization to occur without the mediation of “charismatic leaders,” organizational hierarchies, or political parties. It also allowed regime brutality against unarmed civilians to be captured and instantaneously broadcast via social networks and satellite television across the world. Furthermore, it allowed the oppressed citizens of dictatorships to communicate in real time with their unseen allies in the Arab diaspora, the Gulf, interested Western governments, human rights groups, and media organizations. (“Introduction,” The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future, 2013)
Edited by Jason Pack
These unique features of the Arab Spring movements were only possible because twenty-first-century communications technology allowed for spontaneous mass popular organization to occur without the mediation of “charismatic leaders,” organizational hierarchies, or political parties. It also allowed regime brutality against unarmed civilians to be captured and instantaneously broadcast via social networks and satellite television across the world. Furthermore, it allowed the oppressed citizens of dictatorships to communicate in real time with their unseen allies in the Arab diaspora, the Gulf, interested Western governments, human rights groups, and media organizations. (“Introduction,” The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future, 2013)
As Lynch writes in “Media, Old and New,” however, though social media was a powerful tool for mobilizing protestors and gaining international recognition, the long-standing impact of these is debated:
The new social media and satellite television [...] do not necessarily translate into enduring movements or robust political parties capable of mounting a sustained challenge to entrenched regimes or becoming governing parties. The Internet-driven youth movements at the core of the Egyptian protest movement lost badly in the parliamentary elections to the better organized and more societally rooted Islamist movements. Furthermore, these same tools can strengthen the surveillance and repression capabilities of authoritarian states. (2014)
The legacy of the uprisings
Though the Arab Spring deposed authoritarian rulers in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, many countries involved in the uprisings have not seen sustained and meaningful reform:
Overall, the scorecard for the uprisings that began in 2010–2011 is depressing. In Egypt and all the monarchies, the forces of reaction snuffed out the demands for change. Although the state system as a whole is not threatened—thanks in large measure to the support of both great and regional powers for the status quo—Libya and Yemen do face fragmentation, mainly because of their marginal importance to the regional and international order. Syria’s bloodbath shows no sign of abating [...] (Gelvin, 2018)
With continued political instability in the MENA region, the losses and gains of the Arab Spring have been debated. What is clear, however, is that the events beginning in 2010 have transformed the Arab world, for better or for worse. What cannot be disputed is the important legacy that the uprisings have had on the region, and empowered citizens (particularly young citizens) of these nations to voice their discontent at the status quo and their desire for democracy. As Gelvin writes,
But even if the initial optimism ignited by the uprisings has dimmed, their legacy cannot be entirely discounted. Just as no revolution during the 1848 “Springtime of Nations” ousted any autocrat, its outbreak signaled in retrospect that the field of political contestation in Europe had opened up to include liberal and nationalist alternatives to the old order. While historical analogies are inevitably deficient, a corresponding lesson might be drawn from the recent spate of uprisings. Only this time, uprisings have signaled that global norms of human and democratic rights remain on the table in the Arab world. (2018)
Further reading on Perlego
Amazigh Politics in the Wake of the Arab Spring (2022) by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman
Arab Spring: Uprisings, Powers, Interventions (2014) by Kjetil Fosshagen
The Arab Uprisings: Transforming and Challenging State Power (2015) Edited by Eberhard Kienle and Nadine Sika
Social Media and the Politics of Reportage: The 'Arab Spring' (2014) Edited by S. Bebawi and D. Bossio
The Unfinished Arab Spring: Micro-Dynamics of Revolts between Change and Continuity (2020) Edited by Fatima El Issawi and Francesco Cavatorta
Winners and Losers in the 'Arab Spring': Profiles in Chaos (2022) by Yossi Alpher
What was the Arab Spring in simple terms?
What caused the Arab Spring protests?
What was the aftermath of the Arab Spring?
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PhD, English Literature (Lancaster University)
Sophie Raine has a PhD from Lancaster University. Her work focuses on penny dreadfuls and urban spaces. Her previous publications have been featured in VPFA (2019; 2022) and the Palgrave Handbook for Steam Age Gothic (2021) and her co-edited collection Penny Dreadfuls and the Gothic was released in 2023 with University of Wales Press.