Cyprus at War
Diplomacy and Conflict During the 1974 Crisis
Jan Asmussen
- 384 «pägés»
- English
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Cyprus at War
Diplomacy and Conflict During the 1974 Crisis
Jan Asmussen
«Äböüt Thïs Böök ö ñ»
The recent release of archives relating to the Cyprus War of 1974 shed completely fresh light on the lead-up to the Turkish landing on the island and its aftermath. This book, based on the records from the British and American governments, for the first time unpicks the truth behind this controversial conflict, the effects of which are still felt today. While there was no British-American involvement in the coup that overthrew Archbishop Makarios in July 1974, Jan Asmussen proves that some members of British and American intelligence knew about Athens' plans for a coup to occur at some point in the autumn of 1974, although they did not know the actual timetable nor of Ioannides' decision to put the plan into action. Asmussen explores why the British and the Americans did not take warnings about the coup more seriously and make more effort to tip off the Cyprus government about the imminent danger as well as, equally controversially, the reasons behind Britain's surprising reluctance to exercise her right of intervention on the island. Asmussen analyses the background to the 1974 war as well as the long shadow it casts right up to the failure of the Annan plan in 2004 and Turkey's campaigns to join the European Union. This is a vital re-reading, in the light of recently released documents, of a long-running conflict in the eastern Mediterranean, now transported to the heart of the European Union. It will be an essential source for anyone interested in British or American diplomatic affairs as well as the history of Cyprus.
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- Cover
- Half-title
- Title
- Copyright
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1. The Centre of a Pre-Copernican Universe: A Very Short History of Cyprus
- 2. The Road to Disaster: Makarios and the Junta
- 3. Coup d’état in Nicosia: The First 48 Hours
- 4. Joint Intervention
- 5. ‘Promoting a solution which will be in US interests’, 18 July 1974
- 6. Sisco in Athens and Ankara: Kissinger’s Failure to Restrain the Turks, 19 July 1974
- 7. ‘A new ballgame’: Turkey’s First Military Operation
- 8. The First Two 'Ceasefires’, 21 and 22 July 1974: The Road to the First Geneva Conference
- 9. ‘A net gain for the West’: Political Implications of the Turkish Military Operation
- 10. Further Anglo-Turkish Confrontation, 23–26 July 1974
- 11. Blockade of Northern Cyprus? The First Major Anglo- American Rift
- 12. The Danger for Turkish Cypriot Communities
- 13. First Geneva Conference, 25–30 July 1974
- 14. Between the Talks, 1–12 August 1974
- 15. Second Geneva Conference, 8–13 August 1974
- 16. Stopping the Turks? Final Debates on British/UNFICYP Military Intervention and a Greek Convoy
- 17. War, 14–16 August 1974
- 18. Big and Little Lies: Conspiracy Theories Gain Ground
- 19. Permitting Racial Separation: Attempts at Post-Crisis Management
- 20. Refugees and War Crimes
- 21. Beyond the Crisis: Cyprus from Cold War to Annan
- Conclusion. ‘There is no nation of maniacs I don’t get involved in’: Henry Kissinger’s Idiosyncratic Methods of Working
- Annexes
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index